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 Labelling negative emotion experiences in a discrete way (i.e., negative emotion 
differentiation, or NED) has been found to be associated with lower incidence of several 
forms of psychopathology, including major depressive disorder. However, little is known 
about the mechanisms underlying this relationship. The present study used a two-week 
daily sampling design with 173 undergraduate participants to examine the relationships 
between NED and several momentary processes, including rumination, overgeneralizing 
cognitions, emotion regulation, and source awareness (knowledge about the cause of an 
emotion). NED was found to be significantly associated with lower baseline depression 
and less daily rumination, as predicted. Higher NED was also found to diminish the 
relationship between daily negative emotion and overgeneralizing, such that experiencing 
a bad mood more strongly predicted broad negative thinking about life and the future for 
low differentiators. However, no association between NED and daily source awareness or 
emotion regulation strategy use was observed, failing to support the hypothesis that high 
differentiators are more likely to know the cause of their emotions, and to engage in more 
adaptive regulation strategies (i.e., reappraisal and acceptance). Implications and future 
directions are discussed. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
	
	
To understand emotion differentiation, think back to the most emotionally 
difficult experience you’ve had in the past twenty-four hours. Perhaps it was a necessary, 
but uncomfortable conversation, or the moment you received some unpleasant news. 
Now, try to describe how you felt. For some, the words that come to mind will be specific 
and will each carry distinct pieces of information (e.g., you felt “anxious”, “frustrated”, 
or “disappointed”) while for others, the terms will be broad, and focused mostly on the 
negative valence of the experience (e.g., you felt “bad”, “upset”, or “terrible”). Emotion 
differentiation is the extent to which an individual labels emotional experiences with 
granularity or specificity, taking not only valence, but also arousal, sense of control, 
sense of responsibility, or other dimensions of affect into account. This is sometimes 
conceptualized as a skill, or the ability to represent one’s experience in a differentiated 
way (e.g., Kashdan et al., 2015), and other times as a trait, or the tendency to experience 
one’s emotions in a differentiated way (e.g., Erbas et al., 2015).  
Defining and Measuring Emotion Differentiation 
Emotion differentiation has been found to be distinct from emotion clarity or the 
self-reported sense that one generally knows how one is feeling (Boden et al., 2013). That 
is, expressing confidence about usually being able to know how one feels did not 
significantly predict the use of specific emotion words to describe distinct feeling states.
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Emotion differentiation has been negatively correlated with alexithymia, or the self-
reported inability to sort out or express one’s feelings (Erbas et al., 2014), but only 
modestly (effect size of 0.20).  
In contrast to these traits, however, emotion differentiation is typically measured 
behaviorally through experience sampling methods rather than eliciting dispositional self-
reports. This is because emotion differentiation can itself be conceptualized as an aspect 
of self-awareness, so measuring it using questionnaires that require some degree of self-
awareness may generate invalid results. Differentiation of negative emotions (negative 
emotion differentiation, or NED) is considered separately from differentiation of positive 
emotions (positive emotion differentiation, or PED). There are mixed findings about 
whether they are positively correlated with one another, with some studies showing an 
association (effect sizes between 0.31 and 0.5; Emery et al., 2014; Erbas et al., 2015; 
Selby et al., 2014) and others finding none (Demiralp et al., 2012; Dixon-Gordon et al., 
2014).  
In a typical study, participants are asked at intervals throughout the research 
period to rate the extent to which their current emotional experience is described by 
several positive and negative feeling words. This can be done over the course of 
completing several in-lab emotion-inducing tasks, such as reading vignettes (Boden et al., 
2013; Cameron et al., 2013), writing about personal experiences (Fogarty et al., 2013), or 
watching film clips (Erbas et al., 2015), though this somewhat artificial method has only 
a modest correlation (between 0.23 and 0.26) with more naturalistic approaches (Erbas et 
al., 2015). It is more common to track participants’ emotion reports in their ordinary 
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environments, either with daily diaries (Barrett et al., 2001; O’Toole et al., 2014), 
ecological momentary sampling using beepers (e.g., Boden et al., 2015; Erbas et al., 
2016; Sheets et al., 2015; and many others), or both (Starr, 2017). Since multiple emotion 
words may be endorsed at each instance, an emotion differentiation index is then 
generated for each participant by calculating the intraclass correlation coefficient between 
emotion words across occasions (with negative emotion differentiation being calculated 
using only the negative emotion words, and positive emotion differentiation using only 
the positive emotion words). A low ICC indicates more differentiation, since it suggests 
that the individual is using different emotion terms in distinct ways to express various 
affective states. That is, a participant who selects different words for different 
experiences, based on many aspects of the situation, is exhibiting high differentiation and 
will have a lower correlation among negative emotion words across time points. A high 
ICC indicates less differentiation, as it suggests that the individual is using many of the 
emotion terms similarly to represent various negatively valenced experiences. That is, 
since it is unlikely that all the negative emotions always co-occur across situations for 
any person, a participant with a high ICC between negative emotion words is endorsing 
items based mainly on their valence (selecting “bad” feeling words to describe when they 
are feeling “bad”), disregarding other dimensions of the label. For ease of interpretation, 
therefore, ICCs are typically reverse scored prior to further analyses.  
Correlates of Emotion Differentiation 
More differentiation among negative emotions (and to a lesser extent, positive 
emotions – see Selby et al., 2014 and Tugade et al., 2004) has been implicated in several 
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ways with greater psychological health. It has been shown to be associated with greater 
self-esteem (effect sizes between 0.19 and 0.35, Erbas et al., 2014), quality of life (effect 
size of 0.13, Boden et al., 2015), and mindfulness, or attention to the present moment 
(effect size of 0.22, Fogarty 2015, Hill & Updegraff 2012). Negative emotion 
differentiation (NED) has been found to be negatively associated with depressive 
symptoms in samples of undergraduates, with effect sizes ranging from 0.15 to 0.20 
(Erbas et al., 2014), and in a sample of veterans, with an effect size of 0.29 (Starr et al., 
2017). In another study examining a clinical population with a diagnosis of major 
depressive disorder, NED was found to be significantly lower than in healthy controls, 
with an effect size of 0.54 (Demiralp et al., 2012). Similar studies have found lower NED 
in other groups exhibiting various types of psychopathology compared to controls, 
including borderline personality disorder (Suvak et al., 2011, Zaki et al., 2013), social 
anxiety disorder (Kashdan & Farmer, 2014), and autism spectrum disorder (Erbas et al., 
2013). Low NED has also been linked to substance use issues, including alcohol related 
problems (Emery et al., 2014) and heavy smoking (Sheets et al., 2015).   
Furthermore, in three studies (described individually below), higher NED was 
shown to serve as a protective factor against maladaptive behavior even among high risk 
or high symptom individuals (Kashdan et al., 2010; Pond et al., 2012; Zaki et al., 2013). 
In participants with borderline personality disorder, more rumination predicted higher 
rates of non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI), but this association was moderated by NED, such 
that high differentiators did not experience increases of NSSI with rumination (Zaki et 
al., 2013). In another study, intense negative emotions predicted episodes of binge 
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drinking among underage drinkers, but high differentiators drank less after experiencing 
these intense negative emotions than did low differentiators (Kashdan et al., 2010). 
Finally, Pond and colleagues (2012) found that the association between intense 
experiences of anger and subsequent aggressive behavior was weaker for high 
differentiators, suggesting that they were better able to choose non-aggressive responses 
even when experiencing intense anger. In all three studies, emotion differentiation 
moderated the relationship between a difficult or triggering inner experience (i.e., 
rumination, intense negative affect, or anger), and the subsequent maladaptive behavior 
that was associated with the trigger in that group (i.e., NSSI, binge drinking, and 
aggression, respectively). All three studies examined traditionally externalizing types of 
problem behaviors, and internalizing behaviors associated with depression (i.e., 
avoidance, escape, withdrawal) have yet to be investigated in the context of emotion 
differentiation.    
Other Hypothesized Correlates 
Correlate 1: Increased source knowledge. It has been suggested that producing a 
more specific label for a negative emotion provides access to source knowledge, or a 
theory about what has caused the currently experienced emotion (Cameron et al., 2013; 
Erbas et al., 2014, 2016). This contrasts with feeling generally “miserable” or “upset”, 
which does not carry any information about the source. This relationship could also be 
bidirectional, with initial awareness of source providing the ability to use more 
differentiated labels. Many emotion words contain a specific cognitive interpretation, or 
an answer to the question “what about?” in their definitions, as has been long observed 
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(Gordon, 1978). In fact, some models of emotion suggest that most common feeling 
labels cannot be used without at least some knowledge of the source (that is, I cannot feel 
“frustrated” about nothing; I must be able to report some recent nuisance or thwarting of 
my efforts, however vague).  
Boden and colleagues (2015) directly tested the proposed link between NED and 
source awareness for the first time and did find a significant positive association between 
self-reported source knowledge and negative emotion differentiation (effect size 0.24). 
However, source knowledge was assessed using a retrospective, dispositional 
questionnaire which relied on subjects’ self-awareness and memory to report how easily 
they were generally able to identify the reason for their feelings. 
Correlate 2: Rumination. It has also been proposed (Kashdan et al., 2010) that 
having more information about an emotion (including source knowledge) may reduce 
rumination to further try to “figure out” how one is feeling and why. Rumination is a 
repetitive pattern of thinking characterized by passively focusing on one’s own distress or 
potential causes of the distress (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Rumination may be 
initiated for a variety of reasons, including attempted problem-solving or strategizing 
about an unattained goal, and may even be adaptive when focused progress to the 
exclusion of all distractions is required (Altamirano et al., 2010). However, it has been 
strongly linked to depression in many studies (see Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 2008 for a 
review).  
There may be more and less adaptive styles of rumination. Treynor and 
colleagues (2003) identified a “brooding” type of rumination characterized by thinking 
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passively and negatively about one’s current or recent experience (e.g., mentally 
replaying a recent conversation and thinking of everything that went wrong; thinking 
gloomily about one’s own perceived inability to cope as effectively as others). This style 
of rumination was associated with depression both currently (effect size 0.44) and one 
year later (effect size 0.37). In contrast, a second style called “reflective pondering” or 
“reflection” was also identified, which was characterized by an attempt to overcome 
problems or difficulties and was less strongly linked to depression currently (effect size 
0.12) or one year later (0.08). Watkins and colleagues have also identified abstract and 
evaluative rumination (e.g., “What is wrong with me? Why do I always react this way?”) 
as more harmful than concrete, experiential reflection (e.g., “What exactly am I feeling 
right now?”) (Watkins, 2008).  
Since there is some evidence that individuals who tend to engage in rumination 
often believe that it will help them understand and resolve difficult emotions (Watkins & 
Moulds, 2005) it is reasonable to investigate whether the additional knowledge about 
emotions that comes from specific labeling reduces rumination. Two studies have directly 
tested this. Zaki and colleagues (2013) examined NED and brooding rumination (but not 
the reflective pondering style) in a clinical sample diagnosed with Borderline Personality 
Disorder and did not find a significant association (Zaki et al., 2013). Starr and 
colleagues (2017) recently found a significant association between NED and rumination 
among undergraduates and veterans but did not examine brooding and pondering 
separately. In all the studies discussed so far, rumination has been measured using 
dispositional, retrospective questionnaires.  
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Hypothesized Mechanisms 
Mechanism 1: More effective emotion regulation. By far the most commonly cited 
mechanism for the benefits of differentiation is the theory that high differentiators are 
able to engage in more adaptive emotion regulation strategies because of the additional 
information available to them (including source knowledge) from a specific, rather than a 
diffuse, label of their emotion (Erbas et al., 2016; Kashdan et al., 2015; Sheets et al., 
2015; Smidt & Suvak, 2015; and others). This seems to have first been suggested by 
Barrett and colleagues (2001). In their study, more frequent self-reported emotion 
regulation was indeed associated with greater emotion differentiation. However, as in the 
case of source knowledge discussed above, the measure of emotion regulation was 
retrospective; participants were asked to remember the strategies they had used over the 
past two weeks. This is a serious limitation, because research suggests that when asked 
retrospective questions about emotion experience, people employ a different kind of 
processing than they do when answering about the current moment, incorporating their 
own beliefs and expectations, self-schemas, and stereotypes (Robinson & Clore, 2002). 
Particularly in the case of individuals with psychopathology, reduced self-efficacy beliefs 
as well as memory and attentional biases may influence respondents to underestimate 
their use of effective coping strategies and overestimate their frequency of negative 
responses (Abbott & Rapee, 2004, Ingram 1989). This suggests that measuring the use of 
emotion regulation strategies retrospectively may provide more information about how 
participants think of themselves than about their actual everyday behavior.  
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Additionally, in this first study by Barrett and colleagues, only the overall rate of 
emotion regulation of all types (e.g., suppression, reappraisal, distraction) was examined, 
even though the various types have important differences. Suppression is thought to be 
generally maladaptive, while reappraisal is generally adaptive (Gross, 2007). Distraction 
may be a good short-term way to lift one’s mood, but chronic distraction as a means of 
avoidance may be harmful (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). So, though this study is 
frequently cited as showing that higher differentiators engage in more adaptive 
regulation, the authors could only conclude that high differentiators reported more total 
regulation of all types.  
A later investigation (Tugade et al., 2004) examined specific regulation strategies 
separately instead of using a global regulation index and found that higher positive 
emotion differentiation predicted less self-reported use of distraction and more behavioral 
disengagement (i.e., pausing before taking action) to regulate emotions. However, this 
study did not examine negative emotion differentiation, and it also relied only on 
retrospective, dispositional measures of emotion regulation (the participants were asked 
to rate how much they generally used certain strategies in response to stressful events).  
Addressing these limitations, one study by O’Toole and colleagues (2014) 
examined the association between NED and various emotion regulation strategies using a 
daily diary design with a sample of undergraduates. Their findings were mixed regarding 
the proposed mechanism of NED contributing to adaptive regulation - they did find that 
individuals higher in NED were more likely to use reappraisal, as expected, but that NED 
did not inversely predict suppression. It is important to note that participants were asked 
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about their use of emotion regulation strategies in response to their most emotionally 
intense experience that day (which could have been several hours prior to completing the 
daily diary). While this is closer in time than retrospectively reporting on the past two 
weeks, other research has found that even participants asked about coping strategies used 
in stressful situations as recently as 48 hours ago did not give responses that 
corresponded well with what their own in-the-moment reports had been at the time 
(Stone et al., 1998). Therefore, it is not clear at exactly what point (between reporting on 
the current moment to reporting on 48 hours ago), memory failure or recall biases begin 
to alter results. More research using truly in-the-moment reports of emotion regulation 
strategy use is necessary to develop our understanding of the hypothesized connection 
between differentiation and regulation of emotions.  
There are at least two ways that emotion differentiation could serve as a pathway 
to better emotion regulation. The first is that utilizing the emotion regulation strategies 
that have been found to be the most adaptive in the long-term may require some degree of 
specific emotion knowledge. A label for one’s emotion may be a prerequisite for 
reappraisal (Subic-Wrana et al., 2014). At least some knowledge of what has caused the 
current emotion (i.e., source knowledge) may also be necessary, since reappraisal 
involves reevaluating or reinterpreting the meaning of a situation (without source 
knowledge, how would one know what situation to reappraise?). Source knowledge may 
also facilitate non-judgmental acceptance of emotion experience (Baer et al., 2006, 
Feldman et al., 2007). In contrast, attentional control may be the only prerequisite for 
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suppression (Boden & Thompson, 2015) or distraction, which have not been found to be 
as adaptive in the long-term (Gross & John, 2003).    
Secondly, it should be noted that while each emotion regulation strategy discussed 
above has been conceptualized as generally either adaptive or maladaptive, some recent 
evidence suggests that this can also depend on context, and flexibility in choosing an 
appropriate strategy is important (Sheppes et al., 2014). For example, suppression might 
be adaptive in a context in which expression of anger would only produce unproductive 
conflict, but maladaptive in a situation in which masking one’s sadness would reduce 
support from others, and in which non-judgmental acceptance might be advantageous. 
Emotion differentiation might support adaptive emotion regulation by providing more 
information on which to make that choice. Knowing only that you feel “bad” would be 
less helpful. In this case, the greater understanding provided by differentiation could 
serve to bolster a flexible repertoire of multiple emotion regulation strategies, and the 
ability to employ them appropriately.    
Mechanism 2: Reduced overgeneralizing. Another way in which greater negative 
emotion differentiation may be helpful is that knowing the cause of a negative emotion 
may reduce overgeneralizing from that emotion to evaluations about an unrelated 
domain. Support for a negative association between differentiation and generalizing 
comes from two studies (Cameron et al., 2013) in which high differentiators were less 
influenced by incidental disgust (elicited by unpleasant video clips) when subsequently 
asked to make moral judgements about vignettes than were low differentiators. The first 
study was correlational, and the second study replicated the results using a manipulation 
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(participants were instructed to either focus on which specific emotions they were 
experiencing, or simply how bad or how good they were feeling).  
Overgeneralizing in clinically significant ways has not been examined in the 
context of emotion differentiation. In Beck’s cognitive model, overgeneralization is a 
type of distorted thinking believed to lead to depression symptoms (Beck, 1976), which 
has since been supported empirically (Carver, 1998). Similarly, in the learned 
helplessness model of depression, overgeneralizing from a single negative incident to 
broader negative internal, stable, and global evaluations regarding the self, the future, and 
the world is considered a key feature of depressogenic cognitions (Abramson, 1978). If 
more emotion differentiation is associated with reduced overgeneralizing cognitions of 
this kind in response to incidental negative emotions, this would be clinically salient.        
Mechanism 3: Reduced negative arousal. It has been suggested (Zaki et al., 2013) 
that accessing more differentiated information about one’s experience of negative affect 
(including source knowledge) may itself be an effective emotion regulation strategy. One 
series of studies has compared distanced, abstract processing of a difficult emotional 
experience with immersive, concrete “reliving” of the experience. Both approaches were 
found to elicit similar levels of negative affect when the focus was on “what” questions 
(e.g., what sensations participants were experiencing), but distancing was found to buffer 
against negative emotional arousal when the focus was on “why” questions (e.g., reasons 
for the participant’s feelings) (Kross et al., 2005). This “distanced-why” perspective has 
also been shown to reduce immediate physiological arousal (Ayduk & Kross, 2008) as 
well as depressed affect for up to one week, more than either distracting from the 
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experience or reliving it from an immersed perspective (Kross & Ayduk, 2008). This has 
been found to hold true in individuals diagnosed with major depressive disorder, who 
might otherwise be at risk for greater rumination with any increased attention to negative 
emotion experiences (Kross et al., 2012).  
Labeling negative emotions has also been found to reduce anxious arousal and 
increase habituation to anxiety-provoking stimuli in studies of phobic individuals (Niles 
et al., 2015; Tabibnia et al., 2008). For example, in one study (Kircanski et al., 2012), 
arachnophobic participants in the presence of a spider were instructed to say a 
personalized sentence they created, that either 1) used at least two negative emotion 
words to describe their affective response and the spider (e.g., “I feel anxious that the 
disgusting tarantula will jump on me”), 2) used neutral words to describe the spider in a 
way that would help them feel less negatively towards it (e.g., “The little spider is not 
dangerous to me”), or 3) was unrelated, and described a piece of furniture in their home 
and its location. Participants in the negative affective labelling group reported less fear 
and approached the spider more closely than the participants who either verbalized the 
opposite of their likely feelings or distracted themselves. These findings suggest that 
directly labeling the source of one’s negative arousal may serve an independent 
regulatory function of its own.  
One reason for this may be that the verbal, cognitive processing required to apply 
an appropriate affective label to an experience consistently activates the lateral prefrontal 
cortex (PFC), an area which is believed to downregulate the amygdala, reducing 
emotional arousal (Lieberman et al., 2007). More research is necessary to understand 
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how this might apply to negative emotion labelling in everyday life, aside from exposure 
to specific fear cues. 
It is also important to note that in emotion differentiation studies, there are mixed 
findings about whether greater NED is associated with less total negative affect intensity 
(as would be expected if differentiation functions in the same way as verbal labelling in 
the above research, to directly reduce negative arousal). Some researchers have found 
high NED to predict less negative emotion experience (Erbas et al., 2014; effect sizes 
between 0.27 and 0.61), while others have found no association (Demiralp et al., 2012; 
Fogarty et al., 2015).    
Pilot Data on Emotion Differentiation, Rumination and Overgeneralizing 
In a recent daily diary study, our lab examined the evidence for reduced 
rumination (correlate 2) and overgeneralizing (mechanism 2) with higher NED. The 
present study involves a partial replication and extension of these methods, with attempts 
to improve potential measurement issues in the pilot, which is described in more detail 
below. 
Participants were given measures of depression and rumination at intake and 
asked daily about their current mood and their expectations for tomorrow. We expected 
that NED would be negatively correlated with anhedonic depression, conceptually 
replicating previous research on NED and depression (Demiralp et al., 2012, Erbas et al., 
2014). Secondly, if low differentiators tend to feel confused about their negative 
emotions and ruminate more to “sort out” how they are feeling (correlate 2), we would 
hypothesize that NED should be negatively associated with rumination. Further, if low 
 
15 
differentiators tend to overgeneralize readily from incidental negative emotions to 
broader judgements and evaluations (mechanism 2), we would expect any association 
between negative mood and negative expectations about tomorrow (generalizations to the 
future) to be moderated by NED such that the link is weaker for higher differentiators. 
 Our sample of UNCG undergraduate participants (n = 169) were 75% female, 
and ethnically diverse, in keeping with the overall demographics of the university. Our 
data were generated as part of a larger study, which involved the collection of saliva 
samples for cortisol measures and several daily questionnaires regarding social 
interactions, stress, sleep and health, and goal directed behavior. Described here is the 
subset of measures used for investigating hypotheses about emotion differentiation.  
Each participant visited the lab individually for an initial battery of baseline 
measures, which included a 26-item version of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire (Mini-MASQ, Casillas & Clark, 2000) and the Ruminative Response Scale 
(RRS, Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Each participant then completed an online 
daily diary survey each evening for 14 days. In these surveys, current mood was assessed 
using ratings of 23 positive and negative emotion words from the expanded version of the 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS-x, Watson & Clark, 1994). As in previous 
research, NED was calculated for each person from these emotion ratings using the 
intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) between all negative emotions across days. ICCs 
were then reversed so that higher scores indicated more differentiation. Positive emotion 
differentiation (PED) was not examined. Participants were also asked each day to rate 
their expectations for tomorrow, namely, the extent to which they expected tomorrow to 
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be 1) unpleasant, 2) difficult, and 3) enjoyable with respect to a) their relationships and b) 
their work (a total of six items). Their total ratings for “difficult” and “unpleasant”, for 
both relationships and work, were summed to create a total negative expectations index 
(positive expectations were not examined).   
NED scores in our sample were comparable to commonly reported ranges in the 
literature, with a mean (SD) of 0.28 (0.27), and a broad range spanning all possible 
scores, from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1. The mean (SD) rumination score was 
48.11 (14.31), and the mean (SD) anhedonic depression score from the Mini-MASQ was 
21.20 (6.23).  
NED scores were negatively correlated with scores on the anhedonic depression 
subscale of the Mini-MASQ (r = -0.22, p = 0.01), replicating earlier findings linking 
depressive symptoms with low differentiation. The negative correlation between NED 
and RRS scores was exactly at the cutoff for statistical significance (r = -0.19, p = 0.05). 
When decomposed into brooding and pondering subscales, only a small significant effect 
for pondering was observed (r = -0.08, p = 0.04). One limitation may have been that 
rumination was assessed at intake using a dispositional report of how participants believe 
they usually respond to negative experiences (the imperfections of which have been 
discussed), while NED was measured during the daily diary stage of the study, based on 
participants’ in-the-moment reports of mood.  
The relationships between mood, NED, and expectations about tomorrow were 
examined using the “multilevel” package in R, with days nested within persons (mood 
and expectations as level 1 variables, and NED as a level 2 variable). There was an 
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overall positive association between current negative mood and negative expectations 
about tomorrow (b = 0.09, p < 0.001), indicating that the more negative emotion a 
participant was currently experiencing, the more likely they were to report expectations 
that tomorrow would be unpleasant or difficult with respect to work or relationships. 
However, there was no significant moderation effect of NED on the association between 
negative mood and negative expectations (b = 0.03, p = 0.47), failing to provide support 
for mechanism 2 (reduced overgeneralizing).  
One reason for this may have been a confound in the operationalization of 
overgeneralizing (as the association between negative mood and negative expectations 
about tomorrow), since current mood could be caused by an event that does, in fact, 
directly relate to some anticipated event or interaction the next day. For example, a fight 
with a significant other today might result in both a negative current mood and the 
expectation that one’s social interactions tomorrow will be difficult and unpleasant. Or, 
finding out today that you’ve been assigned to work a double shift tomorrow could cause 
both a negative current mood and the expectation that your work tomorrow will be 
difficult and unpleasant. This would not be an example of overgeneralizing, because the 
current emotions are not incidental to the next day’s expectations, they are highly salient.  
To assess this possibility, the present study instead operationalized 
overgeneralizing as the association between current negative mood and scores on the 
Depressive Attributions Questionnaire (DAQ). Respondents were asked to what extent 
they endorsed statements like, “I think my life will never get better”, and “I can’t see 
anything positive in my life”. These items were able to more sensitively assess the kind 
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of overgeneralization that would be predicted to accompany low differentiation and lack 
of source knowledge, and potentially lead to depression. If current negative mood were 
caused by an interpersonal conflict, for instance, it would be an overgeneralization to 
conclude, “I can’t see anything positive in my life”, instead of “I am frustrated and 
disappointed [an example of differentiation] about how our conversation went earlier [an 
example of source knowledge], but there are positive things in my life related to work 
and my other relationships”. Additionally, the present study examined rumination using 
daily reports of both brooding and pondering in the moment.     
Goals and Hypotheses 
The present study investigated the association between depressive symptoms and 
negative emotion differentiation and assessed the evidence for two proposed correlates of 
NED: 1) increased source knowledge, and 2) reduced rumination. We also explored 
evidence for two of the proposed mechanisms (which need not be mutually exclusive): 1) 
that NED increases access to more adaptive emotion regulation strategies, and 2) that 
NED reduces overgeneralization from incidental negative emotions to evaluations in 
unrelated domains. Depressive symptoms and baseline rumination were measured at 
intake, and a daily diary method was used to assess participants’ in-the-moment emotion 
experience, source knowledge, emotion regulation strategy choices, as well as ruminative 
and overgeneralizing thinking.  
Hypothesis 1. Replicating previous research and the findings of the pilot study, we 
expected to see a negative association between NED and depression. 
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Hypothesis 2. If high differentiators do have access to more knowledge about the 
source of their feelings (correlate 1), we would expect to find a positive correlation 
between NED and daily reports of source knowledge.  
Hypothesis 3. If NED decreases the need to ruminate over negative emotions to 
try to “sort them out” (correlate 2), we would expect to see a negative association 
between daily rumination and NED. We did not have a strong basis for predicting which 
subtypes of rumination would be more or less associated with NED.  
Hypothesis 4. If mechanism 1 is correct, and NED increases access to adaptive 
emotion regulation strategies, we would expect to find that high differentiators engage in 
more daily reappraisal and acceptance (which require the use of meta-emotional 
information), and less daily suppression and distraction (which only involve attentional 
control), than low differentiators.  
Hypothesis 5. In general, expected a) an overall positive association between 
current negative emotion ratings and current overgeneralizing cognitions (that is, we 
expected individuals to make more depressed overgeneralizations when experiencing a 
more negative mood, just as participants in the pilot study had more negative future 
expectations when experiencing a more negative mood). However, if NED reduces 
overgeneralization from incidental emotions to evaluations in unrelated domains, we 
would also expect b) for that relationship to be moderated by NED such that it is weaker 
for high differentiators. 
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 CHAPTER II  
METHOD 
	
	
Participants 
 Two hundred fifteen undergraduate students aged 18 or older were recruited from 
the research pool at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Participants were 
granted course credit for participation. Of this initial pool, 38 (18%) were removed due to 
failure to complete the minimum number of surveys (10 of 14). Additionally, of 2,208 
surveys submitted, 17 (<1%) contained skipped items on critical daily measures and were 
removed, leaving 2,191 complete surveys for analysis. This reduced four of the 
participants’ total number of surveys below the minimum of 10, and they were therefore 
excluded from the study.  
 The final sample with complete data (N = 173) was 74% female, with an average 
age of 19.2 (SD = 2.15). The sample was racially diverse, with 36% of students 
identifying as Caucasian/White, 31% as African-American/Black, 11% as Asian, 9% as 
Hispanic/Latino, and 1% as American Indian. Additionally, 12% selected multiple races 
or “other”. 
Materials 
Demographics Questionnaire. Participants completed a brief demographics 
survey at intake, which included items for age, gender, race/ethnicity, and GPA.
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Anhedonic Depression (AD) Subscale of the Brief Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire (Mini-MASQ, Casillas & Clark, 2000). The AD subscale of the Mini-
MASQ consists of eight items related to low mood and reduced enjoyment and pleasure, 
symptoms which distinguish depression from anxiety alone. At intake, respondents were 
asked to rate the extent to which they have felt the way each item describes over the past 
week, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely), and the ratings are summed to yield 
a total score (see Appendix B for items). The subscale exhibited good internal validity in 
the present sample (alpha = 0.88). 
Modified Ruminative Response Scale (RRS, Treynor et al., 2003). This modified 
version of the RRS was developed by Treynor and colleagues by removing items on the 
original that directly overlapped with DSM symptoms of major depressive disorder. The 
Brooding and Pondering subscales (of five items each) were then distinguished through 
principal components analysis, and were found to show convergent and divergent validity 
with related measures. This measure was administered at intake, and slightly reworded 
items were also administered each day to ask about how much the participant has been 
engaging in ruminative thinking today, rather than how much they usually do this (See 
appendix B). Scores from each subscale were then summed to yield a brooding score and 
a pondering score. Both subscales exhibited good internal validity in the current sample 
(with Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89 and 0.86 for daily brooding and pondering, respectively).        
Expanded Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS-x; Watson & Clark, 1994). 
Current mood was assessed daily using 41 items from the PANAS-x. All subscales 
belonging to the negative affect dimensions (sadness, fear, hostility, and guilt items) and 
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the positive affect dimensions (joviality, self-assurance, serenity, and attentiveness items) 
were included, but not subscales categorized as “other affect” (surprise, shyness, and 
fatigue items). (See Appendix B for the list of items). These ratings were also used to 
calculate the negative emotion differentiation index.  
Source knowledge. Awareness of the source of the participants’ current emotions 
was assessed using a single item: “I think I know what caused me to feel the way I do 
right now.” (rated on a scale from 1 – strongly disagree, to 7 – strongly agree).  
Situational Version of the Brief COPE Inventory (Monzani et al., 2015). Three of 
the four emotion regulation strategies of interest were assessed using their corresponding 
subscales from this measure: positive reframing (i.e., reappraisal), self-distraction (i.e., 
distraction), and acceptance. Each subscale contains two items. Respondents were asked 
to rate the extent to which they had just been engaging in the described behavior to cope 
with their current feelings, from a scale of 1 (I haven’t been doing this at all) to 4 (I’ve 
been doing this a lot) (e.g., “I’ve been turning to work or other activities to take my mind 
off things” - distraction). The subscale ratings were then summed such that each strategy 
yielded one total score per day. Because the scale was originally developed to assess 
recent responses to a stressful situation, and in the present study it was used to assess 
current responses to negative emotions, items were reworded slightly (see Appendix B 
for a full list). 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003). The final 
emotion regulation strategy of interest (suppression) was assessed using items from the 
corresponding subscale of this 10-item measure. The two highest contributing items to 
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the suppression subscale were used, as identified by two independent studies of the 
psychometric properties for this instrument in a U.S (Melka et al., 2011) and a German 
population (Wiltink et al., 2011). As with the Brief COPE strategies, the sum of these 
ratings was used as the total suppression score. For the purposes of the present study, the 
wording was changed to assess the extent to which the respondent is currently employing 
the strategy of suppression (instead of to what extent they usually do so). Finally, for 
continuity, the same response scale was used as in the Brief COPE, from 1 (I haven’t 
been doing this at all) to 4 (I’ve been doing this a lot); for example, “Right now, I’m 
controlling my emotions by not expressing them”. (See Appendix B for a complete list of 
original and reworded items, and their factor loadings for their respective subscales).  
Depressive Attributions Questionnaire (DAQ; Kleim et al., 2011). The DAQ 
consists of 16 statements expressing negative overgeneralizations across life domains 
(e.g., “I think my life will never get better”, and “I can’t see anything positive in my 
life”), and the respondent is asked to rate how much they agree with each item on a scale 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly). This measure has been found to possess 
convergent and divergent validity with related measures. The four items with the highest 
factor loadings were used for the daily surveys, and the wording was adapted to focus on 
current experience (see Appendix B). The total of all four ratings was summed to 
generate the participant’s daily overgeneralizing score. Though the scale was developed 
with multiple subscales in mind, factor analysis showed a single factor model to be the 
best fit, so the present study did not differentiate between subscales. The four daily items 
had good internal reliability in the current sample (alpha = 0.90). 
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Procedures 
First, participants visited a lecture hall on campus where they completed the 
intake measures on desktop computers through Qualtrics. Undergraduate research 
assistants ran participants in groups no larger than 20, to allow for adequate spacing and 
privacy. 
After the intake visit, participants received emailed links to the daily surveys 
every evening at 5:00 pm for 14 days. The links expired at midnight, ensuring that all 
surveys were completed at the end of the appropriate day. This was intended to increase 
response rates by ensuring that participants could plan their availability to complete the 
survey during the same interval each day (rather than receiving surveys at various times 
during the day when they might be in class or at work) and reduce any carry-over effects 
that might result from completing multiple surveys in one day. To discourage attrition, 
participants were only awarded one third of their class credit after participation at intake, 
and the remaining two thirds were earned by completing at least 12 of the 14 surveys.  
Within the surveys, participants were first asked about their current mood, rating 
items from the PANAS-x in randomized order. Next, participants responded to the source 
knowledge item, then the emotion regulation and rumination items from the COPE, ERQ, 
and RRS (presented in randomized order), and finally the overgeneralization items from 
the DAQ.  
DAQ items were placed last to avoid altering participants’ mood and emotion 
regulation (i.e., evaluating global negative statements about one’s life could induce 
negative mood). However, any influence of previous questions on DAQ items is not 
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problematic, since that is part of the construct of interest (the extent to which current 
negative emotional states promote overgeneralizing cognitions).   
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
	
	
All analyses were conducted using the multilevel package in RStudio statistical 
software. Mood (PANAS-x), emotion regulation (from the ERQ and the COPE 
inventory), source knowledge (single item measure), and overgeneralizing (DAQ) were 
level 1 (day) variables, while negative emotion differentiation (NED) and anhedonic 
depression (Mini-MASQ) were level 2 (person) variables. Rumination was measured 
both as a baseline variable at intake (level 2), and during daily surveys (level 1). 
Preliminary Analyses  
Negative emotion differentiation. The negative emotion differentiation score 
(NED) for each participant was calculated as the reversed ICC between that participant’s 
negative emotion ratings across days (positive emotion ratings were not considered in this 
study). Nine participants (5%) had negative ICCs, which were assumed to be zero, 
following the recommendations of Searle et al. (2006) for interpreting negative variance 
components due to artifacts in estimation procedures. NED was not found to be 
associated with participant gender, age, or reported GPA, and differences in NED 
between native and non-native English speakers were not significant.           
Model specification. A step-by-step approach to model building was taken, 
following the suggestion of Robson and Pevalin (2016), to keep all models as 
parsimonious as possible and add levels of complexity only where required. For analyses
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that included day level variables, all ANOVA model comparisons revealed that allowing 
intercepts to vary randomly between participants significantly improved model fit, 
confirming that a multilevel approach was warranted. Allowing slopes to also vary 
randomly further improved model fit for analyses involving overgeneralization, therefore 
random coefficient models were used. For other multilevel analyses, random intercept 
models were used. For all regression results, reported parameter estimates are 
standardized, to aid in the interpretation of the coefficients. Person level variables, as well 
as day level variables in models with a single person level predictor, were grand-mean 
centered, to examine between person variation. Day level variables for random 
coefficient models were person-mean centered, to investigate daily variation from each 
participant’s personal average. Diagnostic plots were examined for all regression models 
to ensure normality and homogeneity of variance among residuals.  
 Survey compliance. A minimum of 10 completed surveys were required for 
inclusion, to ensure adequate sampling of days across the two-week study period. Most 
participants (80%) reached this cutoff. However, simulation studies have shown that as 
few as five level one data points may be acceptable for multi-level modeling (Maas & 
Hox, 2005), and many studies include even fewer than five observations (e.g., Barrett et 
al., 2001; O’Toole et al., 2014). To address the possibility that unnecessarily eliminating 
low compliance participants may have altered the sample characteristics, t-tests were 
conducted between the low and high compliance groups to test for the presence of 
significant differences on any variables.  
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High compliance participants (n = 173) were defined as having reached the 
predetermined cutoff of at least 10 completed surveys. Low compliance participants (n = 
18) were defined as having completed between five and nine daily surveys. T-tests were 
carried out using the Welch-Satterwaithe method rather than assuming equal variances, to 
account for the large difference in group sizes. No significant group differences were 
found for NED, depression, daily or trait rumination of either type, daily use of emotion 
regulation strategies of any type, or daily overgeneralizing cognitions. High compliance 
participants did report significantly more daily source awareness (t = -2.85, p = 0.005) 
than low compliance participants. For this reason, all analyses involving source 
awareness were conducted both on the original sample of high compliance participants 
and on the larger sample of participants with at least five surveys (n = 191). The direction 
and significance level of all effects remained the same, therefore results from only the 
high compliance sample are reported throughout as originally proposed. This was 
intended to increase the likelihood that observed within-person variation would actually 
represent day-to-day fluctuations from each individual’s average over the course of the 
study period, rather than only a few potentially non-representative instances. 
Descriptive Results               
Means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and correlations between person level 
variables are presented in Table 1. In Table 2, means, standard deviations, and 
reliabilities of day level variables are presented, as well as the ICC for each variable.  
The ICC indicates the proportion of the total variance associated with between-
person differences. An ICC below 0.1 or 0.2 (Vajargah & Nikbakht, 2015) would suggest 
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that analyses could confidently be carried out using standard statistical approaches to 
examine variation between days only. However, ICCs for all variables were well above 
this cutoff, indicating that multilevel modeling was necessary to account for the 
clustering of observations by person.  
Table 3 reports the correlations between all day level variables. Values below the 
diagonal are between the aggregated variables (averaged across days) and indicate 
patterns at the person level only. Values above the diagonal represent the relationships 
between disaggregated variables (between days, within persons). 
Hypotheses Testing 
 Hypothesis 1: Depression. Pearson’s correlation coefficient was calculated 
between scores on the anhedonic depression subscale of the Mini-MASQ and NED. In 
accordance with a pre-registered analysis plan, a one-tailed significance test was 
conducted to preserve power and examine the one-directional hypothesis that NED would 
negatively predict depression scores, replicating previous research. In confirmation of 
hypothesis 1 (see Figure 1), depressive symptoms and NED were significantly negatively 
correlated (r = -0.22, p = 0.002). This effect size was similar in magnitude to previous 
findings in the literature, and from pilot data.   
Hypothesis 2: Source knowledge. A multilevel regression was conducted to 
examine the relationship between NED and daily reports of source knowledge and other 
day level outcome variables (see Table 4). NED did not significantly predict source 
knowledge (b = -0.08, p = 0.13), failing to support the hypothesis that higher 
differentiators may have more daily awareness of the causes of their emotions.  
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 Hypothesis 3: Rumination. As hypothesized, higher NED significantly predicted 
less daily rumination, and results were almost identical for brooding (b = -0.20, p = 
0.001) and pondering (b = -0.20, p = 0.001) styles of rumination. Additionally, NED was 
significantly negatively correlated with trait level rumination measured at intake in this 
sample, for both brooding (r = -0.23, p = 0.003) and pondering (r = -0.21, p = 0.005).    
Hypothesis 4: Emotion regulation strategies. NED did not differentially predict 
the use of daily emotion regulation strategies, contrary to predictions. No significant 
associations were found between NED and any strategy (suppression: b = -0.08, p = 0.18; 
distraction: b = -0.10, p = 0.06; reappraisal: b = -0.19, p = 0.36; acceptance: b = -0.06, p 
= 0.26). 
 Hypothesis 5: Overgeneralizing cognitions and mood. As expected, daily negative 
emotions were significantly positively associated with daily overgeneralizing cognitions 
(b = 0.37, p < 0.001). Allowing slopes to vary randomly between persons significantly 
improved model fit, indicating that negative mood did not predict overgeneralizing 
similarly for all individuals (see Figure 2 for a sampling of individuals and their slopes). 
To examine whether greater NED reduces the impact of mood on the tendency to 
overgeneralize, a multilevel regression analysis was conducted adding NED and an 
interaction term between NED and daily negative emotion as predictors. Both day level 
variables were person-mean centered, to control for between-person intercept differences 
(that is, higher scores represented days on which an individual endorsed more than his or 
her average level of negative mood or overgeneralizing). A significant interaction was 
found between NED and daily negative emotion (b = -0.15, p = 0.02), indicating that 
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greater NED was associated with a weaker relationship between negative mood and 
overgeneralizing, in support of hypothesis 5 (see Figure 3). 
 When this interaction was probed further, regression results suggested that the 
within-person positive correlation of negative mood with overgeneralizing was strongest 
for participants with low levels of NED (b = 0.56, p < 0.001) and remained significant for 
participants with medium levels of NED (b = 0.27, p < 0.001). However, daily negative 
mood did not significantly predict daily overgeneralizing cognitions for those high in 
NED (b = 0.06, p = 0.16). This last finding should be interpreted cautiously, because 
regression diagnostics indicated that the residuals were not normally distributed for the 
model with only high differentiators. 
Exploratory and Follow-Up Analyses 
Eliminating days without negative mood. In an unplanned follow-up analysis of 
daily emotion regulation strategies and source awareness, days in which participants rated 
every negative emotion term “not at all” (653 surveys) were removed, and models for 
hypotheses 2 and 4 were reanalyzed. This was to investigate the possibility that NED is 
associated with emotion regulation strategy choice and source knowledge, but not in the 
absence of negative affect (e.g., not when participants were experiencing only positive 
feelings). Greater NED did significantly predict somewhat less use of distraction 
strategies on days when participants reported at least some negative affect (b = -.13; p = 
0.01), but all other effects remained non-significant.  
Controlling for baseline depression in the prediction of daily rumination. To 
examine whether low NED was predictive of greater daily rumination above and beyond 
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baseline depression levels, a follow-up regression analysis was examined. The negative 
association between NED and daily rumination remained significant with depression in 
the model, for both brooding (b = -0.13, p = 0.02) and pondering (b = -0.14, p = 0.01). 
Daily and trait rumination. The correlations between trait-like rumination scores 
(measured retrospectively at baseline) and average daily rumination ratings were 
calculated. Trait rumination scores predicted average daily ratings more strongly for 
brooding (r = 0.52, p < 0.001) than for pondering rumination (r = 0.27, p < 0.001), but 
both associations were positive and significant. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
	
	
 This study used a daily diary design to examine evidence for several proposed 
correlates of negative emotion differentiation (NED). Previous findings regarding the 
negative association between NED and depression were replicated, using a different 
depression measure than in earlier studies. This offers further support for the increasingly 
robust link between low granularity of emotional experience and depressive symptoms. A 
direct, negative association between NED and rumination was observed, consistent with 
the theoretical suggestion that high differentiators may not need to “sort out” their 
emotions by mulling over them. In this sample, the relationship between NED and 
rumination was similar regardless of rumination type (brooding or pondering), both when 
measured retrospectively and in the moment. Given the well-established and reciprocal 
relationship between rumination and depression (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), it is also 
important to note that the effect of NED on daily rumination remained significant when 
baseline depression scores were included in the model. This suggests that NED has 
predictive value above and beyond baseline depression levels and may be related to 
ruminative thinking independent of the presence of depression symptomology more 
broadly. 
Rumination was measured daily because it was hypothesized that trait-like 
measures at intake may not capture behavior as accurately. The need for a distinction
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between trait and daily measures of rumination was supported by the fact that the two 
were significantly associated in this sample, but only moderately - on the same order as 
the associations observed between distinct but closely related constructs such as 
depression and brooding or brooding and pondering. NED was negatively associated with 
both trait and day level measures of rumination. These findings suggest that both trait and 
daily measures of rumination are relevant to emotion differentiation, but they may 
represent different processes.   
Furthermore, NED was found to significantly moderate the positive association 
between daily negative mood and overgeneralizing cognitions. This finding provides 
support for one theorized mechanism for the negative association between NED and 
depression, that low differentiators may be more likely to overgeneralize from a current 
negative emotion to pessimistic conclusions about their life and future more broadly. The 
present study represents the first direct test of this commonly cited theory.  
It may be the case that a reduction in overgeneralizing from incidental negative 
mood may also serve to regulate emotion intensity. That is, if a low differentiator 
experiences a low mood and then draws the conclusion that life will likely always be 
miserable (overgeneralizing), he or she is likely to feel even more intense negative 
emotion. On the other hand, if differentiating reduces overgeneralizing, it might also 
interrupt this cycle and regulate the original sad mood.   
A self-report item intended to measure current source knowledge was not found to 
be associated with NED, failing to provide support for hypothesis 2, that greater 
differentiation should result in increased awareness of the cause of emotional 
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experiences. Past research regarding source knowledge has largely been conducted by 
manipulating participants’ attributions in the lab, rather than investigating how source 
knowledge functions in daily life. To date, no other studies have examined source 
knowledge in the moment. The first researchers to assess individual differences in source 
knowledge were Boden & Berenbaum (2011), and the trait-oriented measure the authors 
developed for that purpose is the only one in use in the literature. The single item, state-
oriented measure used in the present study had strong face validity, however it does not 
have established convergent or divergent validity with related measures and has not been 
tested in other samples. It is possible that the item did not adequately capture the 
construct of interest. 
Support for the hypothesized relationship between NED and emotion regulation 
strategy choice was minimal. A negative association with distraction was observable only 
when days were limited to those in which participants were experiencing negative affect, 
in an exploratory follow-up analysis. With all observations included, there was no 
significant association between NED and any strategy. While the idea that NED supports 
more adaptive emotion regulation strategies is frequently alluded to in the literature, the 
empirical support for this idea is currently limited. The seminal study by Barrett and 
colleagues (2001) on this topic only found that high differentiators engaged in more of all 
types of emotion regulation (when reporting retrospectively). A follow-up study by 
O’Toole and colleagues (2014) only found partial support for the prediction that NED 
would be differentially associated with adaptive regulation strategies (higher NED was 
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associated with more reappraisal only). The present study finds no associations. This 
raises questions about exactly how differentiation relates to regulation. 
First, some research suggests that the ability to flexibly select different strategies 
as appropriate for the context is adaptive (Sheppes et al., 2014), not necessarily increased 
access to specific strategies. Perhaps future research can aim to assess “Emotion 
Regulation Differentiation”, either using a similar approach to measurement as with NED 
(i.e., the reversed ICC of emotion regulation ratings) or novel methods. Eldesouky and 
English (2018) have recently examined a construct they call “regulatory flexibility”, by 
calculating the standard deviation of number of emotion regulation strategies used per 
day and the overall standard deviation of ratings. They found that frequent daily 
reappraisal (but not frequent daily suppression) was associated with more “regulatory 
flexibility” in older adults. Caution should be exercised, however, before assuming that 
greater variation in strategy use is always adaptive. It may be that strategic, appropriate 
shifts in strategy are beneficial while the frantic, desperate use of every strategy available 
is not effective. To facilitate a better understanding of such nuances, future research in 
regulatory flexibility or differentiation should also identify and examine relevant 
situational, temporal, and cognitive factors whenever possible. For example, one study 
investigated physiological cues that prompt strategy switching and found that shifting in 
response to internal cues was adaptive, but random shifts were maladaptive (Birk & 
Bonanno, 2016).  
Second, it may be the case that NED is best conceptualized as a regulatory 
process itself, without necessarily being linked to other strategies. This is consistent with 
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the related finding that the activitiy of emotion labeling disrupts amygdala activity 
(Lieberman et al. 2007). If that were the case, we might expect high differentiators to 
engage in other emotion regulation strategies somewhat less frequently. 
Finally, it is possible that people with higher NED are more effectively using the 
various regulation strategies (e.g., more appropriate to the situation, more competently), 
but not more or less frequently. For instance, in one sample of PTSD patients, choosing 
distraction for high intensity emotions and reappraisal for low intensity emotions was 
adaptive, but selecting in the opposite way was maladaptive (Levy-Gigi et al., 2015). 
Future NED studies should investigate whether high differentiators select emotion 
regulation strategies in different ways, at different times, in response to different stimuli 
than low differentiators.  
These results also highlight the importance of determining whether current 
negative affect is a pre-requisite for meaningful in-the-moment measures of emotion 
regulation. While previous studies employing daily emotion regulation ratings have 
included all observations (e.g., Eldesouky & English, 2018; O’Toole et al., 2014), it is 
reasonable to wonder how endorsements of suppression or reappraisal statements should 
be interpreted when there is no negative emotion present to regulate. If participants are 
attempting to regulate positive emotions, for example, is that relevant to hypotheses about 
negative emotion differentiation? Alternatively, perhaps a strategy is so successfully 
down-regulating the participant’s original negative emotion that it is no longer present to 
be reported.      
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Strengths and Limitations 
The use of a daily diary design is one significant strength of the present study. 
This methodology provides the ability to obtain spontaneous self-report information 
about current emotional and cognitive experiences in the participants’ natural context. 
Additionally, the constructs under investigation ranged in the degree to which 
they fluctuated in time within persons, which a diary design allows us to study. For 
example, among all the level 1 variables examined, overgeneralizing and brooding 
rumination had the highest ICCs (0.72 and 0.63, respectively), indicating that more than 
half of the variation in daily scores was accounted for by between-person differences. 
Source knowledge had the lowest ICC (0.38), indicating that most of the variation in 
scores was due to between-day differences. This has implications for future research, 
since the density of data collection points chosen for any study should reflect how the 
variables of interest are theorized to vary in time (Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013, p. 5). It 
may be the case that brooding and overgeneralizing are more stable, trait-like tendencies, 
which some participants engage in frequently while others do not at all. While self-report 
may still be more accurate when assessed in the moment rather than retrospectively, it 
may not be important to have many repeated instances of measurement for these 
variables. On the other hand, perhaps the degree to which any person is aware of the 
source of an emotion depends more heavily on the situation, suggesting that this variable 
would be best investigated with at least daily observations. 
One limitation of the study is that all models are based on cross-sectional data, 
and cannot provide information about the direction of effects. While a daily diary design 
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has advantages over reliance on retrospective self-report, the intervals between sampling 
times make it unfeasible to examine lagged effects (e.g., does sad mood in the morning 
predict overgeneralizing later in the day?). Even more intensive experience sampling 
methods, such as brief surveys collected multiple times throughout the day, would likely 
capture a greater variety of affective and cognitive processes, and allow for observing 
how these unfold over time.  
Secondly, one drawback of repeated measures approaches in general is the 
possibility of a reactivity effect among participants (Barta et al., 2012). Participation in 
the study may itself promote heightened awareness of experiences, such as mood states, 
due to frequent ratings over the two-week period. This in turn may impact participants’ 
cognitions and regulation strategies. 
Finally, the present study was conducted with an undergraduate, rather than a 
clinical or community sample of participants, limiting confidence in the generalizability 
of the findings.  
Future Directions 
Critical and basic questions still remain about negative emotion differentiation. Is 
NED trait-like and stable, or is it malleable? And if it is malleable, under what conditions 
does it change? For example, greater NED is an increasingly well-established predictor of 
lower depression symptoms, in both clinical and student samples. However, the direction 
of this effect is still unknown. Is increased differentiation protective against depression, 
or is low specificity in labeling emotion experience a symptom of depression? The 
relationship could also be bidirectional. Future studies should examine changes in NED 
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and depression over time in a variety of circumstances. For example, in the treatment of 
depressed patients, many therapy modalities introduce processes that seem likely to 
improve the ability to identify emotions with specificity (e.g., daily thoughts and feelings 
logs, mindful attention to emotion experience). Other interventions, such as behavioral 
activation or antidepressant medication, do not seem likely to modify emotion labeling 
processes. If NED improves with treatment in all cases, this would suggest that low NED 
is a symptom of depression. If NED mediates outcomes in only the former types of 
treatments, this might indicate that low NED is a vulnerability to depression which is 
ameliorated with certain interventions. It may even be that low NED patients benefit from 
different treatments than high NED patients whose depression is driven by other factors, 
a line of inquiry which would have significant clinical implications. 
Secondly, NED researchers can refine and test current methods of measurement. 
The standard approach of having participants rate many emotion words is not very 
ecologically valid, since we do not describe our emotion experiences that way in our 
everyday lives. Can we develop more naturalistic methods to assess this construct using 
spontaneous and free-form responses from participants? Even when using the current 
rating method, various studies use different sets of emotion words, usually without 
supplying rationale. Future researchers should investigate whether including more or 
fewer emotion words effects findings. 
Finally, much of the currently available research on NED is correlational and 
cross-sectional. Future longitudinal and experimental studies can extend our knowledge 
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by examining causality among the various processes that have been identified as salient 
thus far.
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Correlations for Person 
Level Variables  
    
 M SD a 1 2 3 
1. NED .30 .27  -    
2. MASQ-AD 21.56 6.68 .88 -.22**   
3. RRS-brooding 12.06 3.84 .75 -.23** .28**  
4. RRS-pondering 10.92 3.84 .82 -.21* .20* .46** 
 *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 
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Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, ICCs, and Reliabilities for Day Level 
Variables  
	
 M SD ICC a 
RRS-brooding 7.50 3.58 .63 .89 
RRS-pondering 7.04 3.06 .56 .86 
ERQ-suppression 7.59 3.31 .50 .84 
COPE-distraction 7.55 3.23 .49 .76 
COPE-reappraisal 8.31 3.18 .48 .86 
COPE-acceptance 9.01 2.94 .47 .81 
Source Knowledge Item 5.77 1.20 .38  - 
DAQ 5.57 3.08 .72 .90 
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Table 3. Correlations Among Day Level Variables  
	
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. RRS-brooding  .60 .22 .17 .14 .16 .04 .41 
2. RRS-pondering .84  .17 .16 .13 .13 .05 .34 
3. ERQ-suppression .52 .49  .45 .38 .35 .03 .18 
4. COPE-distraction .41 .40 .81  .47 .33 .00 .10 
5. COPE-reappraisal .22 .22 .63 .75  .51 .06 .07 
6. COPE-acceptance .21 .21 .57 .60 .72  .13 .08 
7. Source Knowledge 
Item 
-.18 -.16 -.13 -.13 .07 .21  .01 
8. DAQ .74 .60 .42 .25 .04 .10 -.18  
Note: Within person estimates are above the diagonal, and between person estimates are 
below.  	
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Table 4. NED Predicting Day Level Outcome Variables (Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4) 
  
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 
  
 Negative Emotion Differentiation 
Outcome b SE p 
Source Knowledge Item -0.08 0.05 .13 
RRS-brooding -0.20 0.06 <.01** 
RRS-pondering -0.20 0.06 <.01** 
ERQ-suppression -0.08 0.06 0.18 
COPE-distraction -0.10 0.05 0.06 
COPE-reappraisal -0.19 0.20 0.36 
COPE-acceptance -0.06 0.05 0.26 
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Figure 1. NED and Depression Symptoms (Hypothesis 1) 
  
  
r	=	-0.22,	p	<	0.01	 
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Figure 2. Illustration of Relationship Between Negative Mood and Overgeneralizing 
(Slope) in Twenty Participants 
	Note. Points represent daily ratings with each participant’s overall average set to zero  
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Figure 3. Effect of Negative Mood on Overgeneralizing, by Levels of NED 
(Hypothesis 5) 
 
Note. For Low NED (red), b = 0.56, p < 0.001, for Medium NED (green), b = 0.27, p < 0.001, and for 
High NED, b = 0.06, p = 0.16. 
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS 
 
 
Anhedonic Depression Subscale of Mini-MASQ 
Instructions: Below is a list of feelings, sensations, problems, and experiences that 
people sometimes have.  Read each item and then select the number that best describes 
how much you have felt or experienced things this way during the past week, 
including today. 
 
Responses: 1 (not at all), 2 (a little bit), 3 (moderately), 4 (quite a bit), 5 (extremely) 
 
Number on 
full Mini-
MASQ 
Item 
1 (reversed) Felt really happy 
5 Felt withdrawn from other people 
9 (reversed) Felt like I had a lot to look forward to 
11 Felt like nothing was very enjoyable 
15 (reversed) Felt like I had a lot of interesting things to do 
19 (reversed) Felt really lively, “up” 
23 (reversed) Felt like I had a lot of energy 
25 (reversed) Felt like I was having a lot of fun 
 
Casillas & Clark, 2000  
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PANAS-x Items 
Instructions: This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe 
different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then select an answer, indicating 
how much you are feeling this way right now.  
 
Responses: 1 (very slightly or not at all), 2 (a little), 3 (moderately), 4 (quite a bit), 5 
(extremely) 
 
Items Subscale 
afraid, scared, frightened, nervous, jittery, shaky Fear 
sad, blue, downhearted, alone, lonely Sadness 
guilty, ashamed, blameworthy, angry at self, 
disgusted with self, dissatisfied with self 
Guilt 
angry, irritable, hostile, scornful, disgusted, loathing Hostility 
cheerful, happy, joyful, delighted, enthusiastic, 
excited, lively, energetic 
Joviality 
proud, strong, confident, bold, fearless, daring Self-Assurance 
alert, attentive, concentrating, determined Attentiveness 
calm, relaxed, at ease Serenity 
 
Watson & Clark, 1994 
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Emotion Regulation Items 
Instructions: The next set of items are statements that describe various strategies that 
people use to cope, or deal with their feelings. Please select the response that describes 
how much you have been using each strategy in response to the emotions you are 
feeling right now. If an item doesn’t seem to apply to you, just select 0 (I haven’t been 
doing this at all).  
 
Responses: 0 (I haven’t been doing this at all), 1, 2, 3 (I’ve been doing this a lot) 
 
Original Item Reworded Item Scale 
(subscale) 
Factor 
Loading 
I control my emotions by 
not expressing them. 
Right now, I’m 
controlling my emotions 
by not expressing them. ERQ 
(Suppression) 
0.721, 0.892 
I keep my emotions to 
myself. 
I’m keeping my 
emotions to myself right 
now. 
0.681, 0.702 
I've been trying to see it 
in a different light, to 
make it seem more 
positive.   
I’m trying to see things 
in a different light, to 
make them seem more 
positive right now. 
COPE 
(Positive 
Reframing) 
0.773 
I’ve been looking for 
something good in what 
is happening. 
Right now, I’m looking 
for something good in 
what is happening. 
0.723 
I've been doing 
something to think about 
it less, such as going to 
movies, watching TV, 
reading, daydreaming, 
sleeping, or shopping.   
Right now, I’m doing 
things to think less about 
how I’m feeling, such as 
watching movies or TV, 
reading, daydreaming, 
sleeping, or shopping.  COPE (Self-
Distraction) 
0.823 
I’ve been turning to work 
or other activities to keep 
my mind off things. 
Right now, I’m turning 
to work or other 
activities to keep my 
mind off how I’m 
feeling. 
0.543 
I’ve been learning to live 
with it. 
I’m learning to live with 
the emotions I’m having 
right now.  COPE 
(Acceptance) 
0.803 
I’ve been accepting the 
reality of the fact that it 
has happened.  
I’m accepting the reality 
of the way I feel right 
now.  
0.553 
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Modified RRS 
Instructions: The next questions are about some of the many things people may do or 
think about when they are feeling down or sad. Please select the answer that shows how 
much you’ve been doing each item today.   
 
Responses: 0 (I haven’t been doing this at all), 1, 2, 3 (I’ve been doing this a lot) 
 
Number 
on Full 
RRS 
Item  
(all verbs changed to the present continuous tense from the 
original) 
Subscale 
5 Thinking “What am I doing to deserve this?” 
Brooding 
10 Thinking “Why do I always react this way?” 
13 Thinking about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better 
15 Thinking “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?” 
16 Thinking “Why can’t I handle things better?” 
7 Analyzing recent events to try to understand why I’m feeling 
the way I am.  
Reflection 
11 Going away by myself to think about why I feel this way.  
12 Writing down what I am thinking and analyzing it. 
20 Analyzing my personality to try to understand why I’m feeling 
this way. 
21 Going someplace alone to think about my feelings.  
 
Treynor et al., 2003 
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Depressive Attributions Questionnaire (DAQ) Items 
Instructions: For this last set of items, please indicate how much you agree with each 
statement. 
 
Responses: 0 (not at all), 1, 2, 3, 4 (very strongly) 
Original Item Reworded Item Factor Loading 
When bad things happen to 
me, I can’t see anything 
positive in my life. 
Right now, I can’t see 
anything positive in my life. 
0.87 
When bad things happen to 
me, I think my life will 
never get better. 
Right now, I think my life 
will never get better. 
0.86 
When bad things happen, 
nothing seems to be in place 
anymore.  
Right now, I feel like 
nothing seems to be in place 
anymore. 
0.82 
When bad things happen to 
me, I am sure it will happen 
again. 
I am sure that the bad things 
that have been happening to 
me will only happen again. 
0.82 
 
Kleim et al., 2011	 	
